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The Industrial Revolution had an enormous influence on the international 
economy, both directly and indirectly. International trade is based on 
differences in the relative costs of production. These costs are determined 
by many factors, such as wages, interest rates and land prices, but also by 
the level of technology. The technological innovations in British textile 
industry in the second half of the eighteenth century made it possible to 
produce cheaper, which gave British industry a comparative advantage over 
manufacturers abroad. As a result exports increased, and in its wake the 
import of raw materials also rose. The spread of industrialisation thus 
changed patterns of trade, but the effects were wider. Trade will take place 
only if transport costs are lower than the difference in production costs. By 
bringing down the price of transport the exchange of goods between 
countries will grow. Because the impact of transport costs varies locally, this 
also leads to shifts in consumption and production.1 Not only the 
movement of goods will grow, but also of labour and capital. When labour 
migrates, this lowers the relative cost of labour, and thus of production at 
the place of destination in comparison to the land of origin. Also when 
capital is invested in foreign economies, this will lead to changes in 
comparative advantage.2 The greater the differences in comparative 
advantage and the lower the cost of transport, the more specialised the 
distribution of production and the higher the interdependency of the world 
will become. 
In this article these processes are looked at in more detail. First, the 
causes and effects of changes in transportation and conservation of 
foodstuffs are reviewed. The following section traces the origins and 
development of the world economy in the nineteenth century. The 
organisation of trade was greatly affected by the growing volume of trade 
and changing trade flows, which is the subject of the third section. In the 
last part the role of government policy and how it interacted with trade is 
 
1 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Transport and economic development in Europe 1789-1914’ in: Railways and 
the economic development of Western Europe (London 1983) 21. 
2 K. O’Rourke and J. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of the Nineteenth-
Century Atlantic Economy (New York 1999). 




discussed. Within this discussion the position of Great Britain in the world 
economy will receive special attention. As the leading industrial and 
mercantile nation, Britain was a crucial link in the early world economy that 
brought together mass production and consumption, shipping services, 
insurance and credit and played an important political role by maintaining 
the safety of the seas and working towards trade liberalisation. As this article 
is meant to provide background information an appendix has been included 
with statistical indicators. For ease of overview the tables have been 





The development of the infrastructure in Britain was closely related to the 
growth of its economy. The condition of the road network improved after 
the maintenance of the main trade routes was privatised in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. More importantly, the length of the canal network 
tripled between 1760 and 1830, while its capacity and quality were much 
improved. The costs of long distance bulk transport for important raw 
materials like coal were much reduced by the quadrupling of coastal 
shipping tonnage between 1770 and 1826 (table 1). From 1825 the 
expansion of the rail network was taken to hand with the same enthusiasm 
as that of the canals previously. Within twenty years 3.577 kilometres of 
railway had been laid.3 For states with less access to water transport the 
railroads were even more important for bringing mobility across large 
landmasses. By the start of the First World War most of the inland freight 
in Europe was indeed carried by rail.4 However, traditional modes of 
transport continued to exist alongside the new. Due to the greater 
requirements of a larger population and increasing mobility there was even a 
considerable growth in the number of horses employed in transport during 
the nineteenth century. Most importantly, the competition between 
different types of transport sustained a dynamic of rationalisation and 
innovation that drove transport costs down.  
World shipping had grown slowly but steadily in the early modern 
period. After 1820 the speed of growth picked up rapidly; in Great Britain 
                                                 
3 B. R. Mitchell, and P. Deane, Abstract of British historical statistics (Cambridge 1962) 225. 
4 For example, in France and Germany this share was over 80%. S. Pollard, European economic 
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this already happened from 1780 onwards (table 2). Between 1850 and 1870 
and again from 1870 to 1910 the volume of world shipping almost doubled. 
Throughout the nineteenth century British shipping tonnage constituted 
about a third of all shipping. Improvements in navigation and shipbuilding 
had brought down freight costs, and insurance costs were brought down by 
the eradication of piracy.5 Early steamships were limited in range by the 
need to carry their own fuel, and until the 1860s mainly transported high 
value goods such as mail, passengers and luxuries, while sailing ships 
continued to dominate the long distance trade. Part of the improvements in 
shipbuilding technology also benefited sailing ships, but in the late 
nineteenth century innovations like the screw propeller, compound engine 
and steel hulls made steam engines much more efficient, thus saving on fuel 
costs.6 As steamers were faster, they were able to handle a greater volume of 
goods in the same time and due to their larger size and the labour intensive 
nature of sailing, steamships required fewer men on board for each unit of 
cargo. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened routes to Asia, 
which also benefited steamships. It has been estimated that around 1880 
steamships already supplied 60% of all cargo capacity, while by 1914 sailing 
ships had lost almost all impact on international transport. As a result of 
these developments international freight costs fell by half between 1820 and 
1850 and again up to 1913.7
Quite as important as the increased speed and falling costs of 
transport were the developments in conservation techniques. With the 
extension of preservation time, distant producers could enter the European 
market for fresh produce. In the 1860s meat extract was exported from 
South America and in the late 1870s compressed cooked meat followed. 
Cold storage was facilitated in the 1860s through improvements in cooling 
house technology. Cooling compartments in ships appeared in the 1870s, 
carrying American and later Australian and Argentinean meat to Europe. 
The first experiments of meat transport by rail were a mixed success, but by 
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1879 a practical cooling wagon was patented.8 However, the public 
remained suspicious of canned foods and the cost of making cans was high, 






The roots of the world economy extend back several hundred years. World-
wide co-ordination in price movements for gold and silver was apparent by 
the end of the seventeenth century, followed by a number of tropical 
products for the European market, such as sugar, by the end of the 
eighteenth century. By then some integrated markets also existed in Asia. 
However, these markets did not include bulk products and the overall 
volume was rather small. The integration of European markets for large 
staples, such as grains, already took place before 1800. This process 
continued and sped up after the Napoleonic Wars.9 Between 1830 and 1910 
more than 60% of European imports originated from within Europe and 
around 70% of its exports were destined for other European countries.10 At 
the same time the share of traded commodities rose in comparison to 
production as trade grew faster than production (see table 3 to 6).  
By the mid-eighteenth century Great Britain had built up an 
extensive trade network. There were export surpluses to Europe, West 
Africa and colonies in the Americas and Asia, which were balanced out by 
shortfalls with the Baltic, the Far East and the British West Indies.11 Within 
this network Great Britain fulfilled an entrepôt function, with the share of 
re-exports remaining fairly stable at just under a fifth of total export value 
(table 10). Several triangular flows of goods and capital based on Great 
Britain came into existence around 1870, which developed into one 
                                                 
8 Goodwin, B.K., Th.J. Grennes and L.A. Craig, ‘Mechanical Refrigeration and the 
Integration of Perishable Commodity Markets’, paper presented before the Fourth World 
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10 Bairoch, Commerce extérieur, 82-84. 
11 S.B. Saul, Studies in British overseas trade, 1870-1914 (Liverpool 1960) 4-8. 




integrated network of trade and capital flows by 1900. This system made it 
possible to finance bilateral trade deficits with surpluses elsewhere and thus 
allowed stronger growth of trade in general, as well as facilitating the 
monetary system by reducing the need for gold flows. The interdependence 
of trade was especially strong in these multilateral trade relations, because 
the exports to one area allowed the import from another; while they were 
also closely linked to capital flows. Restrictions in one area of the system 
thus had consequences for the system as a whole. In 1914 about 70% of 
world trade was bilateral, 20 to 25% multilateral and slightly over 5% 
consisted of foreign investment and non-trade money flows.12
Foreign markets were increasingly important for British industry 
(table 7). Foreign trade grew rapidly at the end of the eighteenth century, 
but the pace slackened considerably during the Napoleonic Wars. In the 
decade after the battle of Waterloo foreign trade actually contracted, but 
after that the rate of growth picked up. The bulk of exports in the late 
eighteenth century was comprised of manufactures (table 8). More than half 
of these were textiles, while at the end of the century the emphasis shifted 
from woollen fabrics to cotton. The share of manufactures initially 
increased but towards the middle of the century raw materials, such as coal 
and iron, gained in importance.13 
As a world economy was taking shape in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, industrialisation spread to continental Europe and 
Northern America. There was a fear that this would lead to an increasing 
overlap in products, but it hardly seems to have affected the expansion of 
trade. This was because for most countries and for world trade as a whole 
manufactures never became the dominant product group. By 1913 only in 
Great Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland were manufactures the 
main export category. Furthermore, the share of manufactures in world 
exports declined from 41% in 1853 to 38% in 1911. After 1850 the British 
lead in manufacturing was rapidly diminished, especially by the growth in 
Germany and the United States (table 13). The British share of world trade 
dropped from around 20% to less than 14% by the late 1890s, at which 
level it stabilised.14 In 1861 Great Britain had held 66% of all cotton 
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spindles in the world, but by 1913 this share had fallen to 39%. It had 
supplied 63% of all the world’s capital goods exports in 1800, but by 1913 
this was just 31%. By that time the German market share was nearly as 
high.15 British manufacturing exports shifted increasingly to her colonies 
and southern South America. In these areas, Great Britain remained the 
dominant trading partner. In 1913 Great Britain received 59% of the 
exports of its dominions and supplied 38% of their imports. In 1865 Great 
Britain had exported 20% of its cotton goods to Europe and the USA, but 
this fell to 7% by 1913, while the share of exports to Asia increased from 
43% to 63%.16 Also worrying was that the share of manufactures in British 
imports, which had been around 5% for most of the nineteenth century, 
rose as well (table 8). 
The causes and extent of British ‘decline’ are still hotly debated. An 
important element can be discerned from the estimates of the share of the 
‘new technology’ industries in the total output (table 12). From these 
estimates it can be computed that around 1830 and 1860 Great Britain 
supplied roughly two-thirds of ‘new technologies’ manufactures in the 
world, but that this share rapidly declined to somewhere between 15 and 
20% by 1913.17 It has been argued that industrial competitors could benefit 
from British technology without paying the full price of innovation, but this 
does not apply to industries such as electronic equipment and chemicals, 
which only developed after 1860. Neither can this argument explain why 
some British industries lost their technological advantage. Various authors 
have pointed at failures in entrepreneurship, the low appreciation of 
technical education in British society and the obstruction of trade unions to 
labour saving machinery. It might also be true that the ‘old’ industries with 
little scope for technological improvement were too successful and that this 
reduced incentives to invest in new technologies.18 However, international 
competition inevitably increased with the spread of industrialisation, while 
rising protectionism harmed export industries. British trade was particularly 
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vulnerable as its exports were concentrated on a few products, which were 
all highly export dependent. 
Among the imports of the main industrial countries raw materials 
were initially more important than foodstuffs (table 8). During the second 
half of the nineteenth century, however,  some raw materials, like hemp and 
madder, were replaced by surrogates, while the production of others, like 
sugar, was moved to industrial countries. Technological improvements also 
increased the efficiency of raw material use. For example, world cotton 
consumption grew by 6.0% per year between 1826-1830 and between 1856-
1860, but only by 3.3% between the latter date and 1896-1900.19
Industrialisation also resulted in a change in consumption. The 
growth of the urban population led to a higher ratio of consumers to 
agricultural producers, and rising real incomes led to different expenditure 
patterns. Foodstuffs for instance fell as a share of the household budget, 
while manufactures increased. Furthermore, basic foodstuffs became less 
important to the diet, while the proportion of meat, dairy and fruits 
increased. Great Britain, and later continental Europe, became more 
dependent on imports. The import share of gross agricultural product in 
Europe increased from 3% in the period 1845-1854 to 15% in the decade 
1875-1884, at which level it stabilised until the onset of the World War.20 
The average distance travelled by agricultural products imported in Europe 
also increased (table 14), and European farmers found it much harder to 
maintain their position. First sheep started to disappear from Europe as 
wool prices fell, but this could be compensated for by shifting to other 
products as long as urban and industrial demand grew. However, after 1870 
the lowering of transport costs led to a rapid expansion of cultivation of 
‘virgin lands’ in the Americas and Russia.21 European farmers now found 
the price of grain driven down by foreign competition and their range of 
alternatives narrowing. By 1900 improved conservation techniques also 
allowed butter, meat and fruits to be shipped from the Southern 
Hemisphere to Europe in significant quantities. Great Britain had become 
the main market for agricultural products, absorbing almost 30% of world 
imports in 1876-1880 and a fifth in 1911-1913 (table 15).22 This caused a 
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high dependency on agricultural imports (table 16). Only in the area of 
highly perishable goods were British farmers able to maintain their market 
share. 
British terms of trade were falling from 1820 to 1860, which means 
that exports (mostly manufactures) received lower prices while more was 
paid for imports (mostly raw materials and food). Great Britain therefore 
had to export more to buy the same amount of imports. This implies that 
the worldwide production of manufactures grew faster than foreign 
demand, while British demand for foodstuffs and raw materials grew faster 
than could be supplied from overseas. Prices for foodstuffs increased as a 
result of population growth in Europe, while growing industrialisation 
drove up demand and prices for raw materials. From 1860 on this trend was 
reversed, mainly because of falling agricultural prices.23
The changes in the world economy were also the result of the 
growing mobility of production factors. Lower transport costs increased the 
mobility of labour more than of commodities, and emigration to Australia, 
South Africa and South America preceded the increase of trade with these 
countries. The movement of labour from densely populated Europe to 
sparsely populated areas helped to lower international wage differences, 
created demand for consumer products but also stimulated production 
abroad. Between 1820 and 1913 almost twelve million migrants left the 
United Kingdom.24 But Europe alone could not satisfy the need for labour 
in these areas. Slave shipments across the Atlantic continued far into the 
nineteenth century, and labourers were contracted from India, the Dutch 
East Indies and China. Opposition to these latter type immigrants mounted 
in the settler colonies, and they became subject to increasing administrative 
and legal discrimination. 
The British balance of trade was negative throughout the whole 
period, which was made up for by returns on foreign investment and the 
export of services (table 11). Capital exports on a large scale started around 
1870, mainly from Great Britain. In 1914 it held 42% of the gross nominal 
value of capital invested abroad. Its share in European investments was only 
8% but in the ‘western offshoots’ such as Australia, South Africa and the 
Americas it was 73%.25 The fact that British capital was increasingly 
invested abroad rather than at home may have been another cause for the 
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loss of its technological lead. On the other hand the causal relation may 
have been the other way round and investors turned to foreign projects 





The interconnection of various producing areas increased the importance of 
market information. Improved communications made it possible to respond 
faster to changes in demand and this allowed stocks, and thus costs, to be 
reduced. Communications were already sped up in the first half of the 
nineteenth century by the more efficient organisation of ‘old’ technology. 
Between 1820 and 1860 despatch times over the world had been reduced by 
65%. When the first telegraph link between Great Britain and Paris was 
established in 1851 long distance communications outpaced the ship for the 
first time. In the 1860s despatch times were further reduced, so that 
messages could be sent to any major city around the world in two to four 
days. The establishment of telegraph communications reduced the travel 
time of trade information by 80% compared to surface mail in the North 
Atlantic and by more than 90% from other parts of the world.26 In 1891 the 
telephone connected London and Paris and Marconi’s first radio 
experiments succeeded in 1901, so that by 1914 all major ships were 
equipped with wireless radio. 
Efficiency was also increased by standardisation and co-ordination. 
Especially for perishable goods it was important that there were good 
connections between the different modes of transport. International train 
tables were co-ordinated and railway gauge standardised. In 1865 the 
International Telegraph Union was formed and in 1874 the International 
Postal Association. Legal standardisation was improved in the 1880s by the 
international recognition of national patents, trademarks and copyrights, 
and by the introduction of international rules for private law after 1893. The 
metric system was gaining acceptance outside the former jurisdiction of the 
Code Napoleon and a rich source of confusion was gradually removed by the 
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introduction of time zones.27 Faster communications and internationally 
standardised classification of goods by type and quality also allowed the 
establishment of futures trades where long term contracts of delivery 
increased security and reduced price fluctuations.  
A similar convergence of practices occurred in monetary policy. 
Britain had fixed the value of the pound to gold in 1821, which gave it 
greater security in international transactions and investments. As bills of 
exchange and paper money were easier to transport than gold, many foreign 
banks began to hold pounds as reserves. The German conversion to the 
gold standard in 1873 set off a chain reaction and in the next two decades 
many countries followed. This of course eased, and reduced the risks of, 
international transactions by fixing exchange rates. The Bank of England 
was powerful enough to force foreign banks to adhere to the rules of the 
gold standard. Recent research suggests that trade increased considerably 
between countries who adopted the gold standard and within monetary 
unions.28 Innovation in credit facilities further contributed to the smooth 
operation of the world economy as the growth of world trade outpaced the 
growth of money supply between 1870 and 1892. The gold standard and 
British investment overseas made London the financial capital of the world. 
This role was strengthened by a similar position for shipping and insurance, 
and as the centre for arbitration in grain trade disputes. British trading 
houses had the widest networks and were dominant in most markets, 
although in Europe German firms challenged them in the late nineteenth 
century. The concentration of these services in ‘the City’ also provided 
economies of scale and resulted in enormous information flows on prices, 
supplies and demand from all over the globe. British trade benefited from 
the close association with the London credit market, which provided capital 
at low interest rates, based on the trust in well-established markets with 
large turnovers. Investments often flowed to countries importing British 
goods, especially the dominions, which stimulated demand. The entrepôt 
function of London was challenged in the second half of the nineteenth 
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century, for example in sugar, but it assumed this function for several ‘new’ 
products.29
The large investments required by advancing technology and 
increasing complexity of operations stimulated a process of concentration. 
Economies of scale could be achieved through the optimal use of 
machinery and distribution of labour, but also by horizontal and vertical 
integration. Trusts integrated several stages of the production process and 
distribution, while companies extended their hold over several factories. 
Overseas investments in new plants were made to produce closer to the 
markets and to evade rising foreign tariffs. Savings could also be made in 
research and development and marketing as well as in the concentration of 
capital at a higher level. In this way the fixed costs could be spread over a 
larger volume of output. Because of the large volume of their business, 
these companies also preferred to deal with large suppliers, which again 
stimulated the concentration in those sectors. By the end of the nineteenth 
century European shipping was dominated by a few large companies.30 
North and South American trusts combined the purchase, slaughter, 
packaging and exports of meat and sometimes even the retailing on British 
markets. There was also a movement towards large chains of multiple stores 
in the retail trade from the 1870s. These businesses could achieve 
economies of scale in distribution, credit, purchases and organisation 
through mass turnover. Chain stores started in a limited range of mass 
consumption products, but over time diversified. In 1885 their share of 
turnover in Great Britain was negligible, but by 1914 it was 12-14% in 
groceries and provisions, and 9-11% in meat.31 The multiple store chains 
were an important driving force behind standardisation and quality control. 
Nevertheless, small-scale production remained important, especially 
in crafts and agriculture where the opportunities to benefit from economies 
of scale were fewer. In their relations with the concentrated industries and 
trade, individual craftsmen, farmers and consumers were at a distinct 
disadvantage. Because of their small orders and limited financial credibility 
they obtained less favourable conditions than their larger competitors. In 
response to this they combined into co-operatives for production, the 
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purchase of inputs and consumption goods. In this way they gained market 
power without giving up their small-scale production. Sometimes these co-
operations developed national organisations that achieved such a large 
turnover that they could establish their own factories, like the Co-operative 





Classical trade theorists since the early nineteenth century have held that 
free trade benefits all participants. Under free trade the market should 
induce each country to produce those goods in which it has a comparative 
advantage towards others and this should result in the optimum pattern of 
production and trade. European trade in the eighteenth century was 
anything but free. Even the Dutch Republic had limitations on particular 
import and export products. Great Britain had import tariffs, but also taxed 
exports and even forbade the emigration of persons in certain industrial 
occupations. The Navigation Acts restricted the access of foreigners to 
trade and shipping with Great Britain and its colonies, and forced the 
colonies to trade with the mother country. Part of the grievances of the 
North American settlers in 1775 lay in these Navigation Acts. British trade 
and manufacturing in its ‘infant’ stage thus benefited from protected 
markets and resources in the colonies. As seen above, re-exports made up 
an important part of British foreign trade. The independence of the 
American colonies and the continental blockade during the Napoleonic 
Wars thus threatened to stop British industrialisation in its tracks. This 
forced British manufacturers to look for new markets and increased their 
dependence on India for sales, which in turn greatly damaged India’s large 
indigenous textile industry. The desire to open the South American markets 
for their exports was an important argument for British attacks upon 
Spanish and Brazilian colonies and later support for their independence 
struggle.  
 After 1815 protectionism continued in Europe. Great Britain also 
retained considerable tariffs. However, as trade patterns started to change, 
so did economic interests. In the eighteenth century the British Isles had 
exported grain, but that surplus was turning into a deficit. With the rapid 
growth of industry the political power had started to shift from the landed 
gentry to the industrialists. Armed with the theory of comparative 
advantage, the free trade movement began to demand change. Negotiations 




with other countries to bring about bilateral free trade agreements came to 
nothing. The eventual change to free trade was determined by the wish of 
the British administration to simplify the collection of tariffs and thus bring 
down its costs. In 1842 and 1846 the number of tariff groups was much 
reduced and most items were exempted entirely. The Navigation Acts were 
repealed in 1849. Although the Netherlands and Belgium also reduced their 
tariffs in its wake, the liberalisation of European trade only took place after 
1860 when Britain and France agreed on a liberal trade treaty. France then 
took the initiative to extend the conditions to other countries through the 
most-favoured-nation clause, which effectively offered the lowest tariff level 
in any trade agreement to all other countries with that status. Within a 
decade the system had spread throughout Europe and tariff levels had come 
down considerably. Nevertheless absolute free trade was never achieved, 
not even in England.32  
The economic depression after 1870 cooled enthusiasm for free 
trade. First the farmers were hit by the influx of cheap grain, and later of 
meat and dairy, which limited the possibilities for adjustment in these 
directions. However, due to its decreasing economic importance agriculture 
had lost much of its influence on politics. Industrialist from sectors 
threatened by overseas competition soon added their weight to demands for 
protection. The political weight of these alliances, coupled with concerns 
for home industries and employment drove most countries to increase their 
tariff levels for agricultural and industrial products. Nevertheless tariffs in 
Europe remained at a moderate level, and world trade continued to grow at 
a rapid pace. In Great Britain the Conservative Party adopted protection, 
together with a system of imperial trade preference, as a main campaigning 
item for the elections of 1906. However, free trade sentiments ran deep and 
the Conservatives lost the election. As a result the introduction of 
protectionism and imperial preference was postponed until the 1930s. 
The highest levels of protection were found in the white settler 
colonies in the Americas and Australia, which tried to foster their own 
industry by reducing the imports of manufactures. Low tariffs were forced 
upon China, Japan, Persia, the Ottoman Empire and Siam (present day 
Thailand) by aggressive British and American diplomacy.33 The colonies of 
most European powers were also subject to restrictions on foreign imports 
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in order to retain privileged access to their markets. Officially the British 
colonies adopted free trade but products from Great Britain were favoured 
informally and sometimes even formally. Cultural links through migration 
ensured that differences in language and taste were small, while there was a 
strong ‘imperial’ sentiment that directed consumers towards British 
products.34 In this way the colonies could provide cheap labour, 
unencumbered by social legislation, and valuable natural resources to be 
developed by entrepreneurs from the mother country. Some colonial 
industries were at the forefront of technological and organisational 
development and often proved a dynamic element in the industrialisation 





The Industrial Revolution changed the volume, pattern and organisation of 
world trade. Little more than a hundred years after its start, the ‘revolution’ 
had led to intimate connections between producers and consumers all over 
the world. Mathias even speaks of a ‘quantum leap’ in communications, 
transport and capital flows after 1850.35 Cotton from the American south 
was converted into cloth in Lancashire and then sold in one of the British 
colonies. British capital sponsored railway lines that carried Australian sheep 
to harbours where they were slaughtered and packed to be sent off to 
London. Ships carried guano from Chile to Denmark, where it was used to 
fertilise crops that were fed to cows whose milk was used to produce the 
butter for Manchester workmen. Great Britain was the centre of all that 
trade. Its leading position was attained before the arrival of the world 
economy in the mid-nineteenth century. The high point of industrial growth 
in England actually lies around 1830 when steam transport was still in its 
infancy and trade liberalisation had not yet taken place.36 The dominance of 
British exports was thus mainly achieved by optimising and expanding the 
use of ‘old’ communication technology and in an unfriendly economic 
environment. 
                                                 
34 Platt, ‘Trade competition’, 100-105 
35 Mathias, ‘Emergence’, 10-13. 
36 N.F.R. Crafts and C. Knick Harley, ‘Output growth and the British industrial revolution: a 
restatement of the Crafts-Harley view’, Economic History Review 45 (1992) 703-730. 




 The world economy to a large extent developed on the existing 
British trade and investment networks. Other industrial countries built up 
their own networks, though they never were as extensive as the British.  
Further expansion of trade was made possible by the establishment of 
colonies, while states too strong to be colonised were forced to open their 
markets. The institutions of the world market did not predate but followed 
its establishment: the telegraph, the gold standard, contract formats and 
time zones were all later inventions.  
In 1901 London was characterised as: ‘Mittelpunkt des 
Welthandels, wenngleich nicht mehr des Weltverkehrs.’37 It was also no 
longer the ‘workshop of the world’ and although it still produced almost a 
fifth of world manufactures, it was being overtaken by new industrial 
powers, such as Germany and the USA. These countries broke all the rules 
of classical economics: they were protectionist and their industry was 
dominated by mighty cartels and trusts, yet they thrived. Up to 1914 the 
paradoxical evidence seems to be that protectionism was a better condition 
for growth than free trade.38 It might be that privileged access to markets 
and resources was more important to industrialisation and economic growth 







Table 1. – Annual rate of growth of water transport in Great Britain. 
 
  % 
Length of inland waterways 1780-1830 1.3 
Coastal shipping capacity  1770-1826 2.5 
 




Table 2. – Growth rate of world carrying capacity. 
                                                 
37 Wiedenfeld, Nordwesteuropäischen Welthäfen, 282. 
38 Bairoch, Economics and world history, 44-55. 















Table 3. – Share of commodity trade in production / GDP. 
 
 1830 1870 1913 
UK (Maddison) 12.2 17.5
Europe (Bairoch) 4.4 10.9 14.0
World (Maddison) 4.6 7.9
 
Source: P. Bairoch, Commerce extérieur et développement économique de l’Europe au XIXe siècle (Paris 
1976) 78-79 ; A. Maddison, The world economy : a millennial perspective (Paris 2001) 363. 
 
Table 4. – Annual Growth in % of GDP. 
 
 1700-1820 1820-70 1870-1913 
UK 1.02 2.05 1.90
World 0.52 0.93 2.11
 
Source: A. Maddison, The world economy: a millennial perspective (Paris 2001) 261-262. 
 
Table 5. – Annual growth rates of world exports at 1913 prices. 
 
  % 
All exports, world at constant prices 1850-1913 3.8 
Manufacturing exports, world at constant prices 1850-1913 3.7 
All exports, UK at constant prices 1850-1913 3.1 
Agricultural exports, world at constant prices 1876/80-1911/13 3.2 
 
Source: A. Lewis, ‘The rate of growth of world trade, 1830-1973’ in: S. Grassman and E. 
Lundberg eds., The world economic order: past and prospects (London 1981) 62-65; League of 
Nations, Industrialisation and foreign trade, 157. 
 










Source: A. Maddison, The world economy: a millennial perspective (Paris 2001) app F, 359-361. 
 
Table 7. – Share of exports in British national output and gross industrial 
output 1760-1801. 
 











Table 8. – Pattern of British foreign trade, products. 
 
Imports 1794/6 1860 1910 
Food, drink, tobacco 48 38 38 
Raw materials and semi-manufactures 41 57 39 
Manufactures 11 5 24 
 
Exports 1794/6 1854/6
Food, drink, tobacco 9 6












Food, drink, tobacco 62 31
Raw materials and semi-manufactures 18 64
Manufactures 20 6
 
Source: P. Deane and W.A. Cole, British economic growth 1688-1959. Trends and structure 
(Cambridge 1962) 33; R. Davis, The industrial revolution and British overseas trade (Leicester 1979) 
88-93; B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British historical statistics (Cambridge 1962) 289-
308. 
 
Table 9. – Pattern of British foreign trade, destinations and origins. 
 
Imports 1794/6 1854/6 1913 




North America 7 24 23
West-Indies 25 6 1
Other 2 20 20
 
Exports + re-exports 1794/6 1854/6 1913 
Europe 38 40 37
Asia 13 11 23
North America 28 21 14
West-Indies 18 3 1
Other 3 24 25
 
Source: P. Deane and W.A. Cole, British economic growth 1688-1959. Trends and structure 
(Cambridge 1962) 33; R. Davis, The industrial revolution and British overseas trade (Leicester 1979) 
88-93; B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British historical statistics (Cambridge 1962) 309-
324. 
 
Table 10. – Re-exports as share of total exports. 
 
  1794/6 1854/6 1904/6 
% 24 17 19  
 
Source: R. Davis, The industrial revolution and British overseas trade (Leicester 1979) 88, B.R. 
Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British historical statistics (Cambridge 1962) 283-284. 




Balance of payments 
 
Table 11. – Balance of payments of the UK in million pounds. 
 
 1816/1820 1856/1860 1906/1910 
Balance of visible trade -11 -34 -144 
Net shipping earnings 9 26 89 
Profits, interests, dividends 9 33 196 
Insurance, brokerage, commissions 2 8 22 
Smugglers, emigrants, tourists, government -2 -8 -18 
Balance invisibles trade 18 59 289 
Net balance 10 25 145 
 
Source: P. Deane and W.A. Cole, British economic growth 1688-1959. Trends and structure 
(Cambridge 1962) 36. 
 
 
Technology and competition 
 
Table 12. – UK share in manufacturing production and share of ‘new 
technology’ production in all manufacturing. 
 
 1750 1800 1860 1913 
UK share of world manufacturing 
production in % 1.9 4.3 19.9 13.6 
UK share of world industrial production 
(Capie 1983) in %   21 14 
Share of 'new technology' industries in 
total UK manufacturing in % 0-1 6-10 60-70 72-80 
Share of 'new technology' industries in 
total world manufacturing in % <0.5 1-2 17-23 54-62 
 
Source: P. Bairoch, ‘International industrial levels from 1750 to 1980’, Journal of European 
Economic History 11 (1982) 275, 288, 294; S. Pollard, Britain’s prime and Britain’s decline. The 









Table 13. – British share of world exports, 1870-1913. 
 
 1870 1913 
Merchandise exports 24 19 
Sanufactured exports 46 27 
 
Source: S. Pollard, Britain’s prime and Britain’s decline. The British economy 1870-1914 (London 
1989) 15; A. Maddison, The world economy: a millennial perspective (Paris 2001) app F, 359-361. 





Table 14. – Annual rate of increase of average distance travelled by 
agricultural imports to Great Britain 1831-1909.  
 
 % Fastest growing products 
1831/35–
1856/60 




1.1 Dairy products, wheat & flour, fruit & vegetables  
1871/75–
1891/95 
0.8 Live animals, fruit & vegetables  
1891/95–
1909 
1.0 Fruit & vegetables, dairy products, feed grains  
 
Source: J.R. Peet, ‘The spatial expansion of commercial agriculture’, Economic geography 45 
(1969) 295. 
 









Source: Taylor and Taylor, World trade in agriculture 34, 103-4, 123, 146, 189. 




Table 16. – Imports as % of apparent consumption in United Kingdom. 
 
  1870-6 1904-10 
Milk 0 0.1
Fruit & vegetables 8 24
Meat & livestock 12 36
Dairy & poultry products 40 53
Feed grains 39 61
Wheat & flour 50 84
Wool 53 80










Source: J.R. Peet, ‘The spatial expansion of commercial agriculture’, Economic geography 45 
(1969) 297.  
 
 
